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11. ARGUMENT IN REPLY

A Discoven Exception Exists to LC. 6 19-4902, Failure to Applv the Exception
Was Fundamental Error. And the Record Adeauatelv Demonstrates that Mr.
Person's Petition was Timelv Under the Exception.
Mark Person has argued that the District Court committed fundamental error in
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief as time barred on the claim that counsel was
ineffective in negotiating an unenforceable plea agreement when the claim was filed well within
a year ofwhen the ineffectiveassistance was and could have been reasonably discovered. The
state has attempted to rebut this by arguing that: I ) Mr. Person has not shown that there is a
discovery exception to the statute o f limitations which is applicable in post-conviction; 2) that i f
there is such an exception, it goes to the foundation o f his case for purposes o f application o f the
doctrine o f fundamental error; and 3) that even i f there is a discovery exception, Mr. Person has
not adequately demonstrated when he could have or did learn about his claim o f ineffective
assistance o f counsel. However, none o f these arguments are persuasive.
The state's first argument is that there is no discovery exception to I.C.

5 19-4902. In

support o f this, the state cites and misconstrues language from Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho
189, 191, 30 P.3d 967,969 (2001). See Respondent's Brief at page 8. In Evensiosky, the

petitioner argued that the time for filing his petition for review should have been tolled because a
discovery exception should apply and because he was denied meaningful access to the courts.
The Supreme Court declined to apply a discovery exception because Evensiosky had discovered
the basis for his claim in post-conviction before the one year statute o f limitations had run. Thus,
late discovery could not justify a tolling o f the statute o f limitations. In making this ruling, the
Supreme Court stated, "There is no discovery exception in I.C.

5 19-4902, and the facts o f the

case do not warrant application of a discovery exception. LC. 5 19-4902 expressly limits a
party's time to bring a claim for post-conviction review to one year." Evensiosky v. State, 136
Idaho at 189,30 P.3d at 967 (emphasis added). The state has construed this language to mean
that not only is there no discovery exception set out in the statute, but also that no such exception
exists or can exist under case law.
That this is a misconstruction of Evensiosky is evident from reading the remainder of the
paragraph quoted by the state. The remainder of the paragraph reads: "Further, Evensiosky
discovered the basis for his claim in mid-May of 1997. This was well before his time for filing a
post-conviction review petition expired on July 3, 1997." Id. Had the Supreme Court meant the
first part of the paragraph to establish that not only does the statute not expressly incorporate a
discovery exception in its language, but also that no such exception can be applied by the courts,
then the second part of the paragraph would have been unnecessary and confusing. When the
entire paragraph of Evensiosky is read, it becomes clear that the Supreme Court was not saying
that no discovery exception could be grafted onto the statute by case law, but rather, that the
statute itself does not contain such an exception.
And, indeed, other case law demonstrates that such an exception has been applied by the
Idaho courts.
First, it is important to understand that exceptions to the statute of limitations can be
found even though the statutory language itself does not mention them. Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho
957,88 P.3d 776 (Ct. App. 2003), is illustrative. Idaho Code $ 19-4902 does not contain any
express provision for the tolling of the statute when a prisoner is held in conditions which
effectively deny access to the courts. However, Sayas employs such a tolling stating, without any

need for analysis as to where the court gets the power to add in the exception, "However, the
time limitation may be enlarged when the defendant has been effectively denied access to the
courts." 139 Idaho at 959, 88 P.3d at 778, citing Anderson v. State, 133 Idaho 788,792,992 P.2d
783,797 (Ct. App. 1999). Anderson holds that compliance with the statute of limitations in a
post-conviction application is not jurisdictional, but rather is an affirmative defense that can be
waived if not pleaded by the state.
Second, case law has established a discovery exception to 9 19-4902. The exception was
applied in Fox v. State, 129 Idaho 881,934 P.2d 947 (Ct. App. 1997). InFox, the Court of
Appeals held that a post-conviction claim with regard to ineffective assistance of counsel in a
Rule 35 motion was not untimely even though it was filed later than the time limits set out in §
19-4902 (within one year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of
a proceeding following an appeal). Instead of rejecting Fox's claim because it was filed more
than one year after the time for a direct appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the claims relative
to the Rule 35 motion, which was not decided until some three years after the date of conviction,
ran from the date of the time for an appeal from the denial of the Rule 35 motion, not the date of
the expiration for the time for filing an appeal from the conviction itself. In other words, Fox
applied a discovery exception to LC. § 19-4902, as Fox could not have discovered the ineffective
assistance of counsel until the Rule 35 motion was denied.
Likewise, a discovery exception was applied in Lake v. State, 124 Idaho 259,858 P.2d
798 (Ct. App. 1993), which held that an application for post-conviction relief claiming
ineffective assistance of counsel in a probation revocation proceeding was timely even though
filed more than five years after the conviction, when it was filed within five years of the

probation revocation proceeding. Lake held that the time for the running of the ineffective
assistance of counsel claim could not begin until the ineffective assistance occurred and was
discovered, specifically when the revocation proceeding was held.
Contrary to the state's argument, there is a discovery exception to I.C.

5 19-4902.

The state's second argument is that even if a discovery exception exists, the error in not
applying the exception was not fundamental error and so Mr. Person can obtain no relief.
Fundamental error is error which so profoundly distorts the process that it produces
manifest injustice and deprives the accused of the fundamental right to due process. State v.
Anderson, 144 Idaho 743,748, 170 P.3d 886,891 (2007). By not applying the discovery

exception to the statute of limitations, the District Court denied Mr. Persoil access to the courts
that would otherwise be open to him. As stated in Evensiosky, access to the courts is a
fundamental right grounded in the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. 136
Idaho at 190,30 P.3d at 968 (2001). No error is more fundamental than an error which
erroileously closes and locks the courthouse doors. Contrary to the state's argument, the error in
this case can be addressed under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Anderson, supra. See
also, Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759,762,718 P.2d 1159, 1162 (Ct. App. 1991).

Lastly, the state argues that even if there is a discovery exception, Mr. Person did not
adequately demonstrate when he could have or did learn about his claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel. However, the record makes clear when Mr. Person's claim could have been or was
discovered.
Mr. Persoil could not and did not discover that he had received ineffective assistance of
counsel in entry of his Rule 11 guilty plea until the Court of Appeals held that the district court

did not err in denying his motion to correct his presenlence investigation report and his Rule 35
motion. Until that opinion was rendered, Mr. Person had no way of knowing that counsel was
ineffective in negotiating and advising him to enter a coilditional plea based upon a condition
that could not be performed. That opinion was rendered on October 31,2007, and review was
denied by the Supreme Court on March 11,2008. Mr. Person's petition for post-conviction
relief which was filed in 2007 was therefore timely, as it was filcd wcll within one year of the
time that he could have and did know of the ineffective assistance of his counsel.
Contrary to the state's assertions, there is in fact a discovery exception to the time limits
of I.C. § 19-4902, the error in not applying that exception was fundamental error, and Mr. Person
did adequately demonstrate when he could have and did discover the basis for his claim in postconviction. Therefore, the summary dismissal of his petition should now be reversed.
111. CONCLUSION

As set out in the Opening Brief and above, Mr. Person's petition was not time-barred. He
therefore asks that this Court reverse the order summarily dismissing his petition and remand for
an evidentiary hearing on the merits.
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